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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHELLE ANN COX, : Case No. 20100947-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is not incarcerated. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE INSTRUCTION REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF AN "HONEST BELIEF" UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, 
In her opening brief, Defendant (hereinafter "Cox") argues that the Due Process 
requirements of both the federal and state constitutions placed upon the State "the burden 
of proving that Cox did not believe that she was authorized to cash the check and receive 
the funds therefrom." Br. Appellant at 15. The State does not appear to contest this 
assertion, and acknowledges that the prosecution "bears the burden 'to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is 
charged." Br. Appellee at 17 (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197, 206, 97 S.Ct. 239, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)) (further citation omitted). Contrary 
to this constitutional requirement, Instruction No. 33 (the "honest belief instruction) 
required Cox to present evidence that she had an honest belief that she was lawfully 
entitled to cash the check in question and receive the proceeds therefrom. See, R. 94. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. The State's burden of proof includes both the burden of production 
and the burden of persuasion. 
< 
The State notes that the challenged instruction "advised the jury that Defendant 
had the responsibility or burden of production" with regard to the presentation of 
evidence that the Defendant had an honest belief that she had the right to obtain the 
property in question. Br. Appellee at 20 (emphasis added). Yet the State asserts that 
"Defendant does not contest this allocation of the burden of production" Br. Appellee at 
21 (emphasis in original). The State appears to misunderstand Cox's position. 
The first issue on appeal, as set forth in the Statement of Issues in Cox's opening 
brief, raises the question of "[w]hether the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant in 
violation of her constitutional Due Process rights when the jury was instructed that the 
defendant was required to present evidence that she had an honest belief that she was 
lawfully entitled to cash the check and receive the proceeds therefrom." Br. Appellant at 
1. In Cox's opening brief, Cox clearly asserts that the "requirement that [she] present 
evidence that she had an honest belief that she was legally entitled to cash the check is in 
direct conflict with the constitutional requirement that the State bear the burden of 
i 
proving that she did not believe she was lawfully entitled to cash the check." Br. 
Appellant at 16 (citing State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 777-78 (Utah App. 1980) (further 
citation omitted)). This burden of producing evidence of relevant to Cox's mens rea is a 
part of the burden of proof which constitutionally must be born by the State. 
The concept of "burden of proof' encompasses two distinct burdens: the "burden 
of production" and the "burden of persuasion." Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005). "Burden of production' refers to 'a party's duty to 
introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder, rather 
than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling.'" Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 
2006 UT 16, f49 n.2, 133 P.3d 382 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999)). 
"Burden of persuasion' refers to 'a party's duty to convince the fact-finder to view the 
facts in a way that favors that party.'" Id. "[B]urden of proof is a catchall term that 
encompasses both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production and generally 
refers to 'a party's duty to prove a disputed assertion or charge.'" Id. 
The State's contention that Cox "does not contest [the] allocation of the burden of 
production'' Br. Appellee at 21, fails to acknowledge the legal principle that the burden 
of production is a necessary part of the burden of proof. The State's burden of proof 
includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Schaffer, 
546 U.S. at 56. Whether specifically framed as a challenge to the shifting of the burden 
of "production" or under the broader term burden of "proof," Cox has made a clear 
challenge to the instruction as unconstitutionally requiring her to produce evidence of an 
innocent mental state. See, Br. Appellant at 16 ("[the] requirement that Cox present 
evidence that she had an honest belief that she was legally entitled to cash the check is in 
direct conflict with the constitutional requirement that the State bear the burden of 
proving that she did not believe she was lawfully entitled to cash the check"). 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
* 
B. An instruction which correctly states the allocation of the burden of 
proof does not cure the error created by another instruction which erroneously 
places the burden of production on the defendant < 
The State's position relies heavily on the argument that the instructions, taken as a 
whole, correctly advised the jury on the required burden of proof. See, Br. Appellee at 
15-17. In support of its position, the State quotes several jury instructions given in the 
present case, and asserts that those instructions correctly stated the burden of proof. See, 
i 
Br. Appellee 15-16. 
The State correctly asserts that a jury instruction must be read in context with the 
other instructions that were provided to the jury. Br. Appellee at 17 (citing State v. 
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, f23, 219 P.3d 75). The State further suggests that reversal is 
not required "merely because one instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might 
have been." Br. Appellee (quoting Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, ^|23). The State's 
reliance on Marchet is misplaced. 
Marchet involved an appeal from a conviction for the crime of rape. Marchet 
challenged the elements instruction given to the jury, claiming that it did not "adequately 
inform the jury that the State had the burden of proving his mental state with regard to 
each element of the crime of rape." Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, f2L The Court of 
Appeals clearly held that "[c]ontrary to Marchess assertions, [the challenged jury 
instruction] accurately identified each element of the crime of rape and correctly stated 
the applicable mental state." Id. at %L2. 
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In Marchet, while the challenged instruction may not have been a perfect or ideal 
instruction, it nevertheless was an accurate statement of the law. The present case differs 
from Marchet in that the "honest belief instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. 
"It is elementary that in criminal cases the State has the burden of proving every 
essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hendricks, 258 P.2d 
452, 453 (Utah 1953). Contrary to this constitutional requirement, the "honest belief 
instruction shifted the burden to Cox to produce evidence that she had an innocent mental 
state. 
While it is true that jury instructions must be considered as a whole, an instruction 
that correctly states the burden of proof does not cure another instruction which 
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant. See, 
Hendricks, 258 P.2d at 453; State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1982). Although 
certain instructions may have correctly stated the burden of proof, the "honest belief 
instruction was in direct conflict with such instructions. Where jury instructions "are in 
irreconcilable conflict, they could but confuse or mislead a jury" and reversal is required. 
Hendricks, 258 P.2d at 453. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR DOES NOT PRECLUDE REVIEW 
FOR PLAIN ERROR IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
The State asserts that the doctrine of invited error should act to bar plain error 
review of the "honest belief instruction, by suggesting that Cox "affirmatively approved" 
the instruction below. See, Br. Appellee at 11-13. The State supports this position by 
suggesting that where the record "does not indicate any response from [defense counsel]" 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and "indicates that defense counsel gave c[n]o verbal response/" the record should be 
interpreted as demonstrating affirmative approval of the jury instruction by defense 
counsel. Br. Appellee at 11-12. 
The State cites no authority for the proposition that "no response" from defense 
counsel has the same legal effect as an affirmative approval of a jury instruction. The 
authorities cited by the State are readily distinguishable from the present case. 
The State cites State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742, for the proposition 
that the invited error doctrine applies when a party "fail[s] to object to an instruction 
when specifically queried by the court." Br. Appellee at 13 (alteration in original). The 
present case is distinguishable from Geukgeuzian. 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Geukgeuzian that "a party who fails to 
object to or give an instruction may have an instruction assigned as error under the 
manifest injustice exception " ! 2004 UT 16, «|9 (citing Utah R. Crim. Pro. 19(e)). 
Geukgeuzian states that a reviewing court will not engage in review for manifest injustice 
"if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she 
had no objection to the jury instruction." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^9 (citation 
omitted, emphasis added). 
Unlike the present case in which the State proposed the problematic jury 
instruction, the defendant in Geukgeuzian affirmatively proposed to the trial court the jury 
kTn most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 
'plain error' standard." State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, ^ [10, 171 P.3d 1046 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instruction that was subsequently complained of on appeal. 2004 UT 16 at f 8. Thus, the 
Supreme Court held that the defendant had invited the error. Id. at f 12. 
The State further cites State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987) and State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996) in support of its invited error analysis.2 Br. 
Appellee at 13. These cases are also distinguishable from the present case. 
In Medina, the court declined to review for manifest injustice an instruction 
challenged on appeal where defense counsel at trial "actively represented to the court that 
she had read the instruction and had no objection to it." 738 P.2d at 1023. The court 
noted that defense counsel at trial "consciously chose not to assert any objection that 
might have been raised and affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was 
nothing wrong with the instruction." Id. 
The Supreme Court in Anderson, holding that defense counsel had invited any 
error in relation to a particular jury instruction, noted that "defense counsel read the 
instruction and then affirmatively stated that she had no objection." 929 P.2d at 1109. 
The Anderson court further noted that defense counsel "failed to object to the instruction 
at the trial, even when specifically queried by the court." Id. at 1108 (emphasis added). 
In both Anderson and Medina, there was a specific inquiry or representation made 
with regard to the specific jury instruction language at issue on appeal. Anderson, 929 
2The State also cites to State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). However, Dunn 
invokes the invited error doctrine in connection with an issue involving the admissibility 
of evidence, and is therefore not relevant to the analysis in the present case. See, Id. at 
1220-21. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 
P.2d at 1108-09; Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. Further, the defendant in both Medina and 
Anderson affirmatively stated that there was no objection to the jury instruction that was 
specifically in question. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108-09; Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. 
In the present case, there was no specific discussion of the jury instruction at issue 
on appeal, nor did defense counsel make an affirmative representation to the court that the 
instruction was correct. The record is silent in regard to any response from defense 
counsel regarding the now-challenged instruction. As set forth above, this does not meet 
the standards for invoking the invited error doctrine. 
III. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST AN ACCURATE < 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE BURDEN OF PROOF CANNOT BE 
ATTRIBUTED TO ANY SOUND TRIAL STRATEGY, AND SERVED TO 
DEPRIVE COX OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
The State argues that Cox's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 
denied because trial counsel's actions were based on tactical or strategic decisions, and 
because there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have 
been different but for counsel's performance. See, Br. Appellee at 14-26. For the reasons 
discussed below, these arguments fail. 
i 
A. There is no conceivable tactical reason for trial counsel's failure to 
request an accurate instruction regarding the burden of proof. 
The State argues that Cox's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail 
i 
because "trial counsel had legitimate, strategic reasons for not objecting" to the honest 
belief instruction. Br. Appellee at 23. In support of this position, the State suggests that 
the '"honest belief instruction was favorable to Defendant" because it "emphasized to 
8 
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the jury that the prosecution was required to prove all elements of the offense." Br. 
Appellee at 25. 
In making this argument, the State appears to refer to the final sentence of the 
instruction which states that the "State retains its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt on all elements of the offense charged." See, R. 94. Cox's claim on appeal, 
however, is that the first portion of the instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden to 
the defendant to produce evidence of an innocent mental state. Br. Appellant at 10-18. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the final sentence of the instruction contains a correct 
statement of the law, the first part of the instruction still contains language that 
unconstitutionally shifts to Cox the burden of producing evidence of her innocent mental 
state. See, Br. Appellant at 9-26. Because both offenses charged in this case require 
proof of a guilty mens rea, the shifting of the burden required Cox to produce evidence to 
disprove that element of the charges. Id. at 9-21. The State has not cited to, and defense 
counsel is unaware of, any legal authority indicating that a defendant is somehow put at a 
strategic advantage by being required to bear the burden of producing evidence to 
disprove an element of a crime. 
Contrary to the State's position, it is well-established that a defendant's Due 
Process rights under both the United States and Utah constitutions are violated by shifting 
the burden to a defendant to disprove an essential element of a crime. See, In re. Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970); State v. Hendricks, 258 
P.2d 452, 453 (Utah 1953) (stating "[i]t is elementary that in criminal cases the State has 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
« 
the burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,1fl0 n.5, 988 P.2d 949 (stating that "the prosecution 
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant need not prove innocense"). 
Trial counsel's failure to request an accurate instruction on the burden of proof cannot be 
dismissed as a strategic or tactical decision. See, State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Moritzsky involved a claim of ineffective assistance based on trial counsel's failure 
to request an accurate instruction relating to the burden of proof on the affirmative 
defense of "defense of habitation." Id. at 691. Specifically, trial counsel had failed to 
request an instruction that informed the jury of the statutory presumption that the 
defendant had acted reasonably. Id. at 690. 
The court in Morizsky held, 
[C]ounsel's actions [cannot] be chalked up to trial tactics or 
the like. . . . Obviously, there is no tactical explanation for 
requesting a defense of habitation instruction without 
inclusion of the beneficial presumption. . . . The lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for the omission distinguishes this 
case from many of the previous cases where ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims were rejected. 
Id. at 692. Similarly, in the present case, there is no conceivable tactical basis for trial 
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B. Trial counsel's failure to request accurate instructions on the burden of 
proof created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different, and deprived Cox of a fair triaL 
The State argues, under its ineffective assistance analysis, that Cox has failed to 
show a reasonable probability that, but for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 
result of the trial would have been different. Br. Appellee at 19 (citing State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990) (further quotation and citation omitted). The State's 
position rests largely on the argument that a "reasonable probability is one that 
undermines confidence in the outcome" of the trial. Br. Appellee at 19-20 (citing 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187). 
The State correctly quotes Templin as stating that "[i]n making this determination, 
an appellate court should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such 
factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Br. Appellee at 20 (quoting 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187). However, the nature of the case in Templin distinguishes it 
from the present case. 
Templin involved a charge of rape where "the only issue in contention [at trial] 
was whether the victim in the case . . . consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant. 
. . ." 805 P.2d at 183-84. The allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was based 
on a claim that trial counsel had failed to contact or call as witnesses several individuals 
who would have provided testimony contradictory to the testimony of the alleged victim 
in the case. Id. at 185. 
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The defendant in Templin had provided trial counsel with the names and addresses 
of several individuals who had been with both the defendant and the alleged victim on the 
night in question. Id. If called to testify at trial, these individuals "would have testified to 
the amount of consensual physical contact that occurred between [the defendant and the 
alleged victim]'5 and would have "contradicted several aspects of [the alleged victim's] 
testimony." Id. 
i 
In Templin, the question before the court was whether there was a reasonable 
probability that the additional evidence that could have been presented by the defense at 
trial would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 186-87. In such a 
context, it makes sense for the court to require that the "totality of the evidence" be 
considered in making that determination. See, Id. at 187. 
However, the present case does not involve any question of whether trial counsel 
should have presented additional evidence. Instead, the present case involves a question 
of whether the honest belief instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the 
defendant to produce evidence of her innocense. 
The case of State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, 248 P.3d 70, is more directly on 
point. In Sellers, the issue before the court was whether trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request an instruction which accurately stated the law regarding the burden of 
proof in the case. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38 at ^14-15. The court determined that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient, and then addressed the question of prejudice. Id. at 
1117-19. 
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The court noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that "but for 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different." Id. at f9 (quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f37, 128 
P.3d 1179); accord, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984) (observing that "a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome"). "[S]tated in other words, [a reasonable 
probability exists when] the errors were 'so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'" Sellers, 2011 UT App 38 at f 9 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687). 
In Sellers, the appellate court determined that the jury instruction did not 
adequately address the issue of burden of proof, and that there was a possibility that the 
jury had inferred from the instructions that the burden of proof was on the defendant. 
Sellers, 2011 UT App 38 at f 19. Although the court could not say that the jury actually 
did make such an inference, the possibility of such an inference being made was 
sufficient to undermine the court's confidence in the verdict. Id. (citing State v. Garcia, 
2001 UT App 19, f 16, 18 P.3d 1123). "That lack of confidence equates to a reasonable 
probability that [the defendant] would have received a more favorable outcome had his 
counsel not performed deficiently." Id. The court thus reversed the conviction and 
remanded the case for a new trial. Id. 
Fundamental to the right to a fair trial is the requirement that the prosecution bear 
the burden of proving each essential element of the charged offense. See, e.g., In re. 
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Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. When trial counsel's deficient performance is "so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial" a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38 at ^9 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687). In the present case, therefore, trial counsel's failure to request accurate 
instructions on the burden of proof acted to deprive Cox of a fair trial. See, Sellers, 2001 
UT App 38 at f9. The conviction should therefore be reversed, and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, and those in Appellant's opening brief, Cox 
respectfully requests: for the first issue raised in Appellant's opening brief, that the 
convictions on all counts be reversed and remanded for a new trial; for the second issue 
raised in Appellant's opening brief, that the sentence for theft by deception be vacated 
and the case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
SUBMITTED this (Z~day of March, 201 
( 
>HEN W. HOW; 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH 
I, STEPHEN W. HOWARD, hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with 
the length requirements for a reply brief as set forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
lis I ^ 
^ 
DATED this <^day of March, 2012. 
EPHEN W. HOWARD 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, STEPHEN W. HOWARD, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the 
eight copies of the foregoing with an electronic courtesy copy to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140320, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0230, and two copies of the foregoing with an electronic courtesy copy to the Attorney 
General's Office, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. B^opc 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114-0854, this K ^ d a y of March, 2012. 
Delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and th/Attorney General as indicated 
--? i. above this r^_day of March, 2012. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
